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I. LEGISLATION
A. "Mixed Titles"
Act 329 of 1991 was adopted to change the outcome of cases like
Martinez v. Martinez,' but the statute also has a broader impact. It
imposes on immovable property the heretofore disfavored "split titles"
in which an undivided part of the thing is classified as separate property
and the remaining part is community.
In Martinez, the husband inherited a 1/3 interest in his parents'
home and later purchased the 2/3 interest of his siblings for $60,000,
using community funds. The lower court determined that the house was
1/3 separate and 2/3 community, allocated it to the husband, and then
ordered him to reimburse the wife for community funds expended on
the house. Under the authority of Curtis v. Curtis2 the fourth circuit
court of appeal held that such pro rata division of immovables between
the community and separate estate was not authorized. It concluded
that the house was acquired in part with separate property (the 1/3
inherited interest) and in part with community property ($60,000 in
community funds). Under Louisiana Civil Code articles 2338 and 2341,
the house was thus a community asset because the contribution of
community funds was not inconsequential.
More significantly, the court of appeal used the discretion granted
by Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2801 to allocate this community asset
Copyright 1992, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
Wex S. Malone Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 556 So. 2d 668 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 560 So. 2d 23 (1990). The
court of appeal followed Martinez in Hinckley v. Hinckley, 583 So. 2d 125 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1991).
2. 403 So. 2d 56 (La. 1981). The approach of the fourth circuit court of appeal
was rejected. The appellate court had tried to divide the house pro rata so the spouses
would share the gain from inflation.
3. Caveat: It could be argued that such commingling makes an object community
only when all of it is acquired at one time with contemporaneous use of separate and
community funds. Here, only a one-third interest was initially acquired. The use of
community funds later to pay off the borrowed funds that were used to pay the siblings
was not contemporaneous.
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to the wife. The family home of the husband thus became the separate
property of the former wife. The court supported its conclusion with
testimony by the husband that the wife "butchered" the house with her
redecoration and that she had "destroyed what he remembered as his
family home."" Critics of the result suggested, "[in the more usual
case, however, one would expect that a court would allocate a family
home to the spouse from whose family it descends in light of the
language of 9:2801(c) that the court ... 'shall consider the nature and
source of the asset'. in making the allocation.
Legislation to overturn the Martinez result could have simply
strengthened the quoted language in 9:2801 to make the court allocate
the house to the husband in such a case. Act 329, however, goes beyond
that. It requires a pro rata classification of the asset as part separate
and part community. Its main impact is the adoption of new Louisiana
Civil Code article 2341.1 which provides in part:
A. A spouse's undivided interest in property otherwise clas-
sified as separate property under Article 2341 remains his sep-
arate property regardless of the acquisition of other undivided
interests in the property during the existence of the legal regime,
the source of improvements thereto, or by whom the property
was managed, used, or enjoyed.6
Traditionally, a thing was classified as separate or community at
the moment of acquisition. This approach probably resulted from the
influence of dealings with immovables.7 With them, management was a
prime concern, and the notion of split titles was a hindrance to the
husband's management of community property and to either spouse's
management of his or her separate property. With credit sales, for
example, when separate funds were used to make a down payment and
the balance paid with community funds, the thing was classified as
separate upon its acquisition. When the payments were made with com-
munity funds, the asset was not reclassified as community or as pro
rata separate and community. The remedy that developed to promote
equity in such a situation was not to give the other patrimony an
ownership interest, but to compensate in money for the contribution.
4. 556 So. 2d at 673.
5. K. Spaht & L. Hargrave, Matrimonial Regimes § 3.13, at 6, in 16 Louisiana
Civil Law Treatise (Supp. 1991).
6. La. Civ. Code art. 2343.1(B) provides: "In property in which an undivided interest
is held as community property and an undivided interest is held as separate property,
each spouse owns a present undivided one-half interest in that portion of the undivided
interest which is community and a spouse owns a present undivided interest in that portion
of the undivided interest which is separate."
7. K. Spaht & L. Hargrave, Matrimonial Regimes § 3.22, at 75, in 16 Louisiana
Civil Law Treatise (1989).
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A desire to promote greater equity between the spouses led the
courts to abandon this strict rule in some cases and to classify more
assets according to the pro rata approach, as in other community prop-
erty states. The trend has been to use pro rata classification with newer
types of assets as their division reached the courts-pensions, tort awards,
contingency fee contracts, literary property-while not disturbing the old
rules as to immovables. s
1. The 1980 Revision
The rule against mixed titles was not codified in the 1980 matrimonial
regimes revision. Indeed, the revision provides for a pro rata division
of damage awards in Louisiana Civil Code article 2344. The provisions
there for a retroactive reclassification of the part of the damage award
attributable to lost wages are a potent example of the code adopting
the fair, but complex, solution over the simpler, but probably less fair,
solution to a problem. Also, the prohibition against mixed titles seems
to be no hindrance to the application of Louisiana Civil Code article
2343, which suggests that an asset could be partly separate and partly
community when one spouse donates an interest in a community asset
to the other spouse.
The objection to pro rata classification resting on interference with
the husband's sole management of community assets is less relevant
under the equal management scheme. Alienation, encumbrance or lease
of any community immovable requires the concurrence of both spouses.
The 1980 change in the measure of reimbursement for community
contributions to a spouse's separate estate, or vice versa, results in
serious unfairness in an inflationary economy. Under the new rule,
reimbursement is for half the amount contributed, instead of half the
enhanced value attributable to the contribution. All the increase in value
of a separate house resulting from inflation could go to one spouse,
although community funds were used to pay for part of the credit
portion of the price. In these situations, the equities of the pro rata
classification make it an attractive solution.
2. Since 1980
As the law stood in 1980, there was some support for splitting the
title to some immovables between the separate and community patri-
monies. The courts, however, seemed unwilling to make a change with
respect to immovables. As the Louisiana Supreme Court stated in Curtis
v. Curtis,
B. Id. at 75-76.
19921
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
These cases, among others, also establish that property declared
to be separate at acquisition does not change character if a
subsequent credit payment is made with community funds. Proof
that the community contributed to the purchase of separate
property would only create a debt on the part of the wife's
separate estate to the community for the amount of community
funds used. It would not convert the property or any portion
of it to community property. Only when community and separate
funds are mingled in the initial acquisition may the property be
regarded as community. 9
Martinez may -have been inconsistent with this approach, since the
court did not require contemporaneous acquisition of the separate and
community portions of the property when applying the commingling
rule; however, the supreme court denied writs in that case.' 0
Subsequent legislative policy also supported the supreme court's
approach, at least with respect to immovable property. The 1984 amend-
ments to Louisiana Civil Code articles 2366 and 2367 and the adoption
of Article 2367.1 show a reluctance to adopt pro rata division of
immovables. Under the property law revisions of 1978, it would have
been possible to consider a house built with community funds to be a
community asset even though it was built on the separate land of one
spouse. Nothing would have required classifying the immovable house
the same as the immovable land. Such a division of the interests would
have been a departure from prior cases, but would have been fairer
since both spouses would share in the windfall resulting from inflation
of the value of the house. The legislature acted, however, to prevent
that solution. Under the 1984 amendments, the building clearly takes
on the same classification as the ground on which it was built, and the
reimbursement mechanism is used to compensate for other contributions.
The 1991 amendments to the Louisiana Civil Code, however, change
the direction of the policy trend. To the extent the text of Article 2335
supported a prohibition against mixed titles, Act 329 revises the article
to indicate the rule applies "except as provided in Article 2341.1"; the
latter provision then goes on to adopt a split title theory." The re-
quirement of split titles in some instances will no doubt support courts
finding that such pro rata division of assets will be proper in other
contexts.
Louisiana Civil Code article 2341.1 states that "a spouse's undivided
interest in property otherwise classified as separate" remains such "re-
9. 403 So. 2d 56, 59 (La. 1981).
10. Martinez v. Martinez, 560 So. 2d 23 (La. 1990).
1I. In a small sense, the addition makes the article somewhat imprecise, because pro
rata division of assets or split titles is allowed in Articles 2343 and 2344 as discussed
above.
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gardless of the acquisition of other undivided interests in the property
during ... the legal regime." In a Martinez situation, the husband's
inherited interest would remain his separate property. The other 2/3
interest bought from the siblings during the community with community
funds would be community property.
3. On Partition
The unique provisions of Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2801 govern
partitions of community property. The husband's separate property (1/
3 ownership of the house, in a Martinez situation) would not be part
of the 9:2801 partition at all. The judge could allocate the community
asset (the 2/3 interest) to the husband, to the wife, or divide it between
them. The judge could not affect the separate property, however. If a
partition by licitation were the solution, the judge in the 9:2801 pro-
ceeding could order sale of only the 2/3 community interest. Of course,
in the normal situation, the judge should allocate the community 2/3
to the spouse owning the separate 1/3 interest and offset that award
with other community assets to the other spouse. At least that is the
preferable solution if there are other sufficient assets. In a Martinez
situation, the family home would thus remain in the husband's family,
with his having to provide other community assets to provide an equal
division of the value.
However, the code article as adopted would allow a 9:2801 partition
which still leaves the ex-spouses as co-owners in indivision. The inheriting
spouse would have at least the separate interest and the other spouse
all or part of the community interest. At that point, the ex-spouses
would presumably be treated as ordinary co-owners of property. With
9:2801 no longer applicable, either spouse could then seek a partition,
in kind or by licitation, under the normal rules of partition. 2 In case
of a house, as in Martinez, it would probably be subject to partition
by licitation, with the proceeds being divided between the spouses. 3
It may be that since partitions under 9:2801 and under the regular
rules for partitions are not inconsistent with each other and proceed by
similar procedures, they could be cumulated into one proceeding to
promote efficiency.
4
12. La. Civ. Code arts. 807-818.
13. La. Civ. Code art. 811.
14. La. Code Civ. P. art. 462 requires as a prerequisite for cumulation that the two
actions not be inconsistent and go by the same form of procedure. A regular partition
would proceed by ordinary proceedings, and while La. R.S. 9:2801 has some aspects that
are summary, such an action would normally begin with ordinary proceedings.
19921
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4. Other Effects
Classification of assets as partly separate and partly community
produces other effects that may be a trap for the unwary.
If the husband died intestate with children in a Martinez case, his
1/3 interest would devolve as separate property, to be inherited by his
children in full ownership. 5 His 1/3 interest in the house that was part
of the community would devolve as community property. The children's
1/3 interest would be automatically subject to the legal usufruct of the
surviving spouse. 6 In addition, the wife would come into full ownership
of the remaining 1/3 interest that was part of the community. In such
a case, Louisiana Civil Code article 543 does not preclude a partition
of the property free of usufruct; the children could cause a sale of the
home. This result is contrary to the usual policy, with respect to com-
munity property, of keeping the family home available to the surviving
spouse until death or remarriage.
Under Louisiana Civil Code article 2345, creditors of the wife could
reach 2/3 of the property, but not the 1/3 that was the husband's
separate property. Creditors of the husband could reach all of the
property.
If the thing involved is an immovable, the husband could not sell
the community 2/3 interest without the wife's consent. But nothing
prohibits him from selling his 1/3 undivided separate interest to a third
person.
5. Breadth of the Provision?
Though the article was adopted in response to Martinez, it is not
limited to immovables or to family homes. It covers any property. It
is not limited to inherited property, but covers any "undivided interest
in property otherwise classified as separate property under Article 2341."
The text indicates that the separate undivided interest "remains his
separate property" regardless of the acquisition of other undivided in-
terests. A time relationship is suggested by this language. If an undivided
part is separate, it remains so even though at a later time, a community
undivided part is acquired. On the other hand, if the separate and
community funds are used contemporaneously, the usual rule of com-
mingling would apply. In such a case, the literal text of Articles 2338
and 2341 applies, and the asset is community so long as the community
funds were not inconsequential.
But what if the community undivided interest is bought first, and
then separate funds of a spouse are used to acquire the remaining
15. La. Civ. Code art. 888.
16. La. Civ. Code art. 890.
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undivided interest? Article 2341.1 by its terms would not seem to apply.
In terms of existing doctrine, one could argue this would be the use of
separate funds to improve or acquire a community asset, and the husband
would be relegated to a monetary claim for reimbursement. Or, as in
Martinez, one could argue the asset was obtained with both separate
and community funds at different times, resulting in classification of
the whole thing as community. However, policy reasons supporting a
different result based on whether the separate or the community interest
were acquired first seem difficult to fathom. Perhaps such concerns
could be further impetus to classify the thing acquired to be pro rata
owned as separate property of one spouse in part and a community
asset of both for the remaining part.
B. Matrimonial Agreements and Alimony
Often the impetus for a separate property agreement is to avoid
making a new spouse liable for the other spouse's alimony obligations.
These obligations include alimony to a former spouse and to children
of a prior marriage. Without a separate property agreement, the new
spouse's income is community property which is available to satisfy the
debts of the other spouse, including the alimony claims. If the spouses
are under a community property regime, Louisiana Civil Code article
2362 applies and makes the alimony obligation a community obligation.
If the spouses live under a separate property regime, each spouse
is liable personally for his or her obligations and not for the obligations
of the other spouse. Furthermore, no mechanism exists to make the
new spouse's assets available to satisfy the alimony claims by the former
spouse and the children of the prior marriage. In recent years, the courts
of appeal were split on the question of whether the new spouse's
contributions to the expenses of the new household could be considered
in determining the amount of alimony the other spouse would pay. The
amount due is to' be based on the spouse's income, means and assets,"
or on the circumstances.' 9 It was argued that this language encompasses
the new spouse's contributions to the new household, and in cases like
Finley v. Finley,10 that such contributions b considered in determining
the husband's ability to pay. While it was possible for a separate property
agreement to specify that the new spouse would contribute nothing, it
17. K. Spaht & L. Hargrave, supra note 5, at 72.
18. The language comes from La. Civ. Code art. 112, and applies to alimony to a
former spouse (emphasis added).
19. The language comes from La. Civ. Code art. 231, governing alimony to children
(emphasis added).
20. 305 So. 2d 654 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1974).
19921
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was presumed that each spouse would contribute according to his means. 2'
Even under this broad view, the new spouse had no personal liability
for the alimony; that spouse's total income was not considered; and it
was only that person's actual or presumed (under Civil Code article
2372) contributions to the household expenses that were considered in
determining the amount the other spouse would be able to pay in alimony
to the former wife and to the children of the first marriage.
This long-standing view, at least as it applied to alimony to children,
was apparently challenged in the 1989-1990 child support guidelines
legislation. That statute provides for a determination of a person's
income and then establishes an amount of child support or alimony due
based on that income. That sum is presumed to be the proper amount
of child support to be awarded.22
The statute took a broad approach in its definition of income, going
beyond wages and including "the benefits a party derives from remar-
riage, expense-sharing, or other source." 2' Under a literal construction
of the statute, consideration of such benefits from remarriage were proper
without regard to the type of property regime the spouses had con-
tracted. "4
Act 854 of 1991 was adopted to avoid this broad result; it amended
the child support guidelines to narrow the definition of income. The
result is to provide a spouse greater insulation than ever from involve-
ment in the other spouse's child support obligations. Louisiana Revised
Statutes 9:315(6)(c) now reads:
The court may also consider as income the benefits a party
derives from expense-sharing or other sources; however, in de-
termining the benefits of expense-sharing, the court shall not
consider the income of another spouse, regardless of the legal
regime under which the remarriage exists, except to the extent
21. La. Civ. Code art. 2373 provides: "Each spouse contributes to the expenses of
the marriage as provided in the matrimonial agreement. In the absence of such a provision,
each spouse contributes in proportion to his means." The court in Finley v. Finley, 305
So. 2d 654, 657 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974), stated: "A wife who has separate income or
is separate in property may be obligated to share the expenses of the marriage, thus her
income is available for payment of expenses incident to the marriage. Though under Civil
Code art. 2395, the married persons may stipulate in their marriage contract the manner
in which expenses are to be shared, such a stipulation should not circumvent our policies
governing the payment of child support, especially when . .. the second wife is actually
contributing to the expenses of the second marriage." (citations omitted).
22. 1990 La. Acts No. 117; 1989 La. Acts 2d Ex. Sess. No. 9 (adopting La. R.S.
9:315 et. seq.).
23. La. R. S. 9:315(6)(c) (Supp. 1990).
24. See Comment, Louisiana's Child Support Guidelines: A Preliminary Analysis, 50
La. L. Rev. 1057, 1068 (1990).
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that such income is used directly to reduce the cost of a party's
actual expenses.
If the spouses are living under a separate property regime, it is
clear that the income of the other cannot be considered at all in de-
termining income of the spouse liable for child support. It is also clear
that presumed income cannot be considered. Only if the spouse's income
is used "directly" to pay expenses the other spouse would normally pay
can that amount be considered. The view of the Finley court would
thus seem to be rejected.
More far-reaching, however, is the application of this same rule to
spouses living under a community regime. Ostensibly, the literal appli-
cation of the article would suggest that in determining the spouse's
income for purposes of child support, the new spouse's income cannot
be considered unless used "directly" to reduce the first spouse's expenses.
However, this narrow statute in the revised statutes dealing with child
support does not purport to free the second spouse's income from being
liable to pay the child support obligation. That income would normally
be available to the other spouse's separate creditors under Louisiana
Civil Code article 2345.
Also, the language seems to be inconsistent with the basic theory
of community property. Under Louisiana Civil Code article 2336, each
spouse owns one-half of each item of community property, including
wages when earned. Under that view, the new spouse's income is owned
1/2 by the other spouse and is that spouse's income. The new spouse
also owns 1/2 of the other spouse's income. Each spouse's income,
then, is 1/2 of the total wages and fruits earned by both spouses. Such
an approach seems convoluted and complicated, and simply may not
have been contemplated. Perhaps the simpler solution is to take the
language of the new statute literally, and to exclude the new spouse's
wages and fruits from the equation-treat the spouse with the support
obligation as a single person with respect to the child support obligation
and make the amount to be paid dependent on his earning capacity.
In any event, the amount determined to be income leads to a pre-
sumptively correct amount of child support; the court can still set the
support at a different amount if it chooses.
In its overall effect, the statute basically returns the law, with respect
to separate property regimes, to where it was before 1989, making clear
that the narrower approach of the fourth and fifth circuits is to be
applied.
It is also clear that the child support guidelines do not govern
alimony to a former spouse. Those payments remain covered under the
general rules that traditionally applied. The first circuit may reconsider
its rule of considering the new spouse's presumed contributions to the
new household when determining the other spouse's alimony obligation
to the former spouse in order to be consistent with the latest expression
1992]
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of policy in a related area. There would seem to be no reason to
consider such contributions for alimony to a spouse but not for support
to the children.
1. Recent Cases
a. Classification & Division of Pension Benefits
Hare v. Hodgins2' is the supreme court's first major decision on
pension division since T. L. James v. Montgomery26 and Sims v. Sims 7
and since the adoption of Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2801. The 7-0
decision makes no drastic changes, but it takes advantage of the flexibility
allowed by Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2801. The opinion by Justice
Dennis offers substantial dicta on means of division.
i. The Holding
Hare involved a defined benefit pension plan which had matured.
The employee-husband had retired and was collecting benefits. 2 The
pension right had not been divided when the community was terminated
in 1975, and the benefit was based on years of service both during and
after the community. The trial court applied the Sims formula (com-
munity interest equals the ratio of community years of employment to
total covered years) and ordered the division of the past and future
pension payments on that basis.
The court of appeal for the fifth circuit suggested a radical change.29
It ordered a lump sum payment to the non-covered wife instead of
dividing each monthly payment as received by the covered employee. 0
More important, the court ordered a sum paid to the wife based on
half the actuarial value of the pension in 1975, when the community
25. 586 So. 2d 118 (La. 1991).
26. 332 So. 2d 834 (La. 1975), on rehearing, 332 So. 2d 849 (La. 1976).
27. 358 So. 2d 919 (La. 1978).
28. The plan, funded solely by the employer, accrued annually, the benefit being
based on the employee's average compensation in past years. Had the husband terminated
his employment at the time the community was dissolved, he would have been entitled
to a deferred pension of $952/month at age 65. Thirteen years later, when the plan fully
matured, the husband received $4,038/month. The value of the unmatured pension right
in 1975 was significantly lower than that of the matured pension because the former
reflected a heavy discount because of contingencies that could have prevented the mat-
uration of the pension, e.g., termination of employment or death of the covered spouse.
29. Hare v. Hodgins, 567 So. 2d 670 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1990).
30. "The court's approach in T.L. James and Sims did not force a court to make
a present division of an incorporeal contingent right. This approach has the advantage
of sharing the risks that the benefit will not be paid and of avoiding complex evaluation
issues." K. Spaht & L. Hargrave, supra note 7, at 95.
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terminated, plus legal interest since that time. The effect was to reduce
the wife's award substantially, presumably responding to the husband's
argument that the Sims formula "gives undeserved credit to the com-
munity for the increased benefits he earned after the divorce through
his initiative and industry.""3 The court did distinguish Sims factually,
but did not explain why the differences should produce a different
result.32
The supreme court rejected the court of appeal's approach and
continued to apply the underlying analysis of T. L. James and Sims-
the parties remained co-owners in indivision of the pension rights until
partition. The right was to be valued at the time of partition. The court
recognized that while the court must classify property as of the date of
termination, if the partition is to be made later, the thing is to be
valued at the time of the partition. "Because the community interest in
the pension right is an incorporeal that may accrue or appreciate over
time, or fluctuate in proportion to the employee spouse's separate prop-
erty interest in the pension, the community and separate fractions of
the pension cannot be separated and classified definitively until the
partition." 33
In Hare, the request for partition came when the pension rights had
matured into a monthly benefit. In such a case, the supreme court
found "no abuse of discretion or reversible error in the trial court's
use of a fixed percentage approach. 31 4 It was error for the court of
appeal to impose a fixed payment rather than an ongoing percentage
division.
The supreme court, however, did indicate that the Sims formula is
not a rigid one. It stated that some adjustment may be necessary "in
order to prevent inequity in the present case." Relying on the absence
of a clear rule and on the Louisiana Civil Code's admonition to have
recourse to usages and reason in such instances, it recognized that the
Sims formula is an approximate one that can be further refined to
"take into consideration that most pension plans do not accrue at a
fixed rate throughout a career."" It acknowledged that in some instances
benefits may be attributable in larger part to high separate earnings in
one's later years of employment. In other cases, the early community
contributions, through interest and investment income, might be given
a higher percentage than on a straight time based division.
31. 567 So. 2d at 673.
32. "The Sims' formula is applicable only to similar fact situations and should not
be universally applied to all pension plan benefits." Id. at 673.
* 33. Hare v. Hodgins, 586 So. 2d 118, 122 (La. 1991).
34. Id. at 125.
35. Id. at 127.
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The court then announced a rule that would treat the Sims formula
as presumptively correct, but that if it failed to fairly apportion the
benefit because it does not fairly reflect the community and separate
contributions, it can be altered. The "burden of going forward with
evidence and of persuasion on this issue properly should be assigned to
the employee spouse.''36
The court remanded to the lower court for "further proceedings to
determine whether the community fraction rule underlying the fixed
percentage method applied herein would be modified to reflect that some
of the post-community increases in earnings by the employee spouse
should be attributed solely to his personal effort or skill and not related
to the prior community earnings." 3 '
ii. The Impact
Hare is important primarily because it rejects the view of the court
of appeal that required a lump sum division of a matured pension
benefit and that based the value of the asset at the time of termination
of the community rather than at the time of partition. It represents a
decision that is much more favorable to the non-covered spouse under
the Hare facts and allows that spouse to share in the investment income
and inflationary increases in value of such intangible rights. In that
sense, it reinforces the basic T. L. James and Sims approach that was
articulated by Justice Tate in those decisions.
Hare may be seen as providing more equitable divisions of pension
benefits by allowing proof that the simple Sims formula is not an
equitable indication of the relative contributions of the separate and
community resources of the employee. But that advantage may be more
illusive than real. The Sims formula remains presumptively correct, and
it will often be difficult to muster the proof to show otherwise. At least
when large sums are involved, the battles of the hired experts will be
costly and time-consuming, and will probably produce no clear results.
Often, the burden of proof issue will solve the matter. When lesser
amounts of money are involved, the transaction costs and delay of
proving that another formula is more equitable will often make the issue
too expensive to litigate. Equity at a general, gross level through a
general formula is simple and cheaper. Greater equity through greater
fine tuning of a formula is possible, but at substantial costs.
The umpire in all of this is the trial judge, and since great deference
is given to his conclusions, it is he who will be gaining authority and
greater discretion in these matters.
36. Id. at 128.
37. Id. at 129.
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iii. The Dicta
Justice Dennis' opinion also suggests that greater flexibility is also
available to the trial judge when dividing interests in pension benefits
that are not yet matured. Sims had suggested (or has been construed
as suggesting) that in a judicial partition, the intangible right had to
be held in indivision and could not be simply allocated to one spouse
with a corresponding payment of half the value to the other spouse.
Subsequent cases tended to take that approach.38 However, since Sims
was decided, Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2801 was adopted, incorpo-
rating a new theory of division of community assets, one that specifically
allows, in section 4(c), the judge discretion to allocate assets:
The court shall allocate or assign to the respective spouses
all of the community assets and liabilities. In allocating assets
and liabilities, the court may divide a particular asset or liability
equally or unequally or may allocate it in its entirety to one of
the spouses. The court shall consider the nature and source of
the asset or liability, the economic condition of each spouse,
and any other circumstances that the court deems relevant.
Dennis quoted the Sims language 9 that suggested that no value could
be fixed to such intangible benefits, and called it unfortunate. Justice
Dennis is right, of course, in stating that market values of intangible
pension rights can be determined. In the simplest cases, one simply
determines how much it would cost to buy an annuity with the equivalent
benefits. Actuaries can value even the most complicated plans. But such
values are based on averages and statistical probabilities related to lon-
gevity, inflation, and numerous other assumptions related to a large
population of covered employees. They do not account, for example,
for the person who for some reason is no longer insurable or able to
get such coverage. More important, a present allocation of the asset to
the employee, with a sum of money paid to the other spouse, does not
consider the advantage or disadvantage of sharing the risk that the
benefit will not be paid.
In any event, the dictum acknowledges that it is now within a
judge's power to allocate a spouse's pension, and award a lump sum
to the other spouse, depending on the equities of the situation.40 And,
38. See Breaux v. Breaux, 555 So. 2d 1001 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1990); Meyer v. Meyer,
553 So. 2d 943 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1989).
39. "(Tihe community interest in the retirement plan has no immediate redeemable
cash value. Until the employee is separated from the service, dies, retires or becomes
disabled, no value can be fixed upon his right to receive an annuity or upon lump-sum
payments or other benefits to be paid on his account." Sims v. Sims. 358 So. 2d 919,
923 (La. 1978).
40. Hare v. Hodgins, 586 So. 2d 118, 124-25 (La. 1991).
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to the extent that it may deprive the non-covered spouse of a future
benefit, if that spouse is economically rational, he or she can then
immediately take the sum awarded and purchase an annuity or otherwise
invest the funds to provide ultimately for a retirement benefit. But if
that spouse is not to be employed in the future, the prospects of
increasing that benefit are not as good as that of the covered spouse,
because those group retirement plans will normally produce greater sums.
All of these equitable considerations will now come into play in the
trial judge's decision whether to allocate the pension to the covered
employee or to continue the ex-spouse's co-ownership of the pension
right.
C. Stock Options & Benefits
Any property received in return for the effort, skill or industry of
a spouse during a community regime is community property under
Louisiana Civil Code article 2338. This rule applies whether the property
received is money or an intangible contract right." It should follow that
company stock or options to buy company stock granted to an employee
in return for services rendered during a community regime would be
community property. Typically, however, such employee benefit plans
are designed to do more than just reward for past services. They are
designed also to "encourage valuable employees to continue in the service
of the Company and its subsidiaries." 42
The structure of the plan in Mestayer v. Williams" accomplished
its twin goals of rewarding for past service and encouraging longevity
in the company by assigning shares to the employee each year, but
providing transfer restrictions on the shares for a ten year period. Ten
percent of the stock was freed from the restriction for each additional
year of employment. If the employee terminated his employment before
the stock was freed of restrictions, it could only be sold back to the
company at its low issue price.
In Camp v. Camp,4' the company ESOP (Employee Stock Ownership
Plan) plan provided for issuance of shares at a given time, but full
ownership accrued according to a ten year (later a seven year) vesting
schedule.
In both cases, the employee husbands argued that the stock issued
to them was not fully owned ("vested") by them at the time of the
termination of the community and should not be considered community
41. Forest Oil Corp. v. Wood, 240 So. 2d 401 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970).
42. Mestayer v. Williams, 569 So. 2d 1102, 1103 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1990) (quoting
from the Halliburton Company plan).
43. 569 So. 2d at 1102.
44. 580 So. 2d 553 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1991).
[Vol. 52
MATRIMONIAL REGIMES
property. In each case, the first and third circuit courts of appeal
disregarded the vesting schedule and classified all the stock that had
been issued at the time of termination as community property.
In both cases, the courts relied on the fact that the profit sharing
plan in T. L. James was subject to a schedule of vesting, but the
supreme court made no reference to the vesting concept in determining
that the right was to be based on the amount of contribution per year
in the defined contribution plan at issue there.45 Accordingly, the first
circuit determined that the total sum of shares attributed to the ESOP
at the time of termination "whether vested or unvested" was community
property." The third circuit stated "the restricted shares at issue are an
asset of the community. '4 7
No doubt, the two cases reflect a concern for simplicity and rough
equity and end up favoring the non-employee spouse. But their reliance
on T. L. James may well call the cases into question if it can be shown,
to paraphrase Hare v. Hodgins, that greater equity will be produced by
a more complex formula. As argued in these cases, the stock was granted
in expectation of something that would occur after termination of the
community-continued commitment by the employee to the company in
later years. If he was not married in those later years, it would seem
that the total stock award was based on both community and separate
effort. Indeed, if that were not so, the company would simply grant
the stock without ownership restrictions. It ought to follow that a strict
one-time classification of the stock should not be used if the employee
can prove that the asset was in part attributable to separate effort after
the termination of the community. As in Hare, presumably, the pre-
sumption would be that it was community, and the burden would be
on the employee to prove the separate component of the formula and
the amount of the asset to be attributed to the separate contribution.
D. Disability Benefits
Paym.nts received under disability insurance plans are paid if a
person becomes disabled and is unable to earn income. The benefit
substitutes for income that would have been earned, and the courts are
continuing to apply real subrogation principles in classifying the pay-
ments." If the payments replace what would have been earned during
a community regime, they are community; if they replace what would
have been separate property, they are separate. This is the case without
45. This result was noticed, but criticized in Le Van, Allocating Deferred Compen-
sation in Louisiana, 38 La. L. Rev. 35, 39 (1977).
46. 580 So. 2d at 555.
47. Mestayer v. Williams, 569 So. 2d 1102, 1107 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1990).
48. K. Spaht & L. Hargrave, supra note 7, at 44.
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regard to whether the insurance benefit or the related pension plan was
acquired during a community regime. The concept is fortified by its
adoption in Louisiana Civil Code article 2344, which treats damage
awards for future lost wages in a similar manner.
Federal law establishes a similar result for military pensions. Only
a regular retirement benefit is subject to state community property laws;
disability pension benefits are not, and are separate property of the
covered disabled soldier. 49
Several appellate cases in the current term applied these basic prin-
ciples. In Howard v. Howard,0 the wife had been employed under the
federal civil service for 23 years. That tenure did not qualify her for
a retirement benefit, but she was eligible for disability retirement ben-
efits."' She began collecting those payments in 1983, after her divorce
in 1980. Here, where the disability occurred after termination of the
community and the payments were to replace separate income, the fourth
circuit court of appeal held the payments were her separate property.
The husband had argued the payments were "in lieu" of retirement
benefits and should be apportioned as such. The court rejected the
argument, pointing out: "[tihere was no evidence that, either in effect
or by election, her disability pension is in lieu of retirement benefits.
The disability benefits at issue bear no relation to the community." '
The court's analysis leaves open the possibility that when such a
benefit continues to be paid past normal retirement age, it is no longer
substituting for earned income and is substituting for a retirement benefit.
In such a case, proration of the benefit as one would prorate a retirement
benefit is still possible.
The second circuit court of appeal faced this question in Johnson
v. Johnson. 3 There, the husband obtained disability retirement benefits,
collecting them from 1978 until termination of the community in 1985.
The court held those payments were community, since they substituted
for community income. Also at issue were the payments received after
termination. By 1985, the husband would have been eligible to retire,
and would be obtaining retirement payments rather than disability pay-
ments. He would be obtaining not a substitute for current income, but
a retirement pension based on service time and average salary. The court
49. Rearden v. Rearden, 568 So. 2d 1111, 1114-15 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1990); K. Spaht
& L. Hargrave, supra note 5, at 17.
50. 580 So. 2d 696 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1991).
51. Under 5 U.S.C.A. § 8337 (West Supp. 1991). Cf. United Ass'n of Journeymen
v. Myers, 488 F. Supp. 704 (M.D. La. 1980) for a discussion of the applicability of
federal law to such pensions.
52. 580 So. 2d at 698.
53. 582 So. 2d 926 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1991).
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thus held that his current payments were partly community under the
Sims formula.
The court in Johnson was strengthened in its analysis by the fact
that the retirement system regulations specially provided that disability
benefits would be paid only until the employee becomes eligible for
retirement; then, the benefits would be paid under the retirement system.
The analogy to a retirement pension was quite clear. The same result
ought to follow, however, even if the plan did not so specify. The real
subrogation principle would also support treating the payment as a
retirement benefit from the time of normal retirement age.
The first circuit court of appeal took a similar approach in Arnaud
v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joinders of America,"' which
involved a union negotiated pension trust plan which provided retirement
benefits as well as disability payments for permanent disability. The
husband had been employed during the community, and upon divorce,
the wife was recognized as owner of an undivided interest in his ultimate
retirement benefit. Several years later, he became disabled and the wife
claimed an interest in the benefits he was then collecting. He was 55
at the time, whereas normal retirement eligibility would be 65, and the
court pointed out, "[i]f an individual takes disability retirement, at age
65 it converts to a normal retirement pension.""
The court upheld the lower court's application of the real subrogation
theory and held the benefit was separate since it was replacing separate
property that would be earned at that time. The court acknowledged
that it was in basic agreement with the third circuit's decision in Lachney
v. Lachney,1 which took the same approach. It distinguished its own
decision in Johnson v. Johnson," which had classified disability retire-
ment payments under the New Orleans Firefighters' pension fund as
community earnings even after the divorce. It would appear that the
court's bases for distinguishing Johnson-whether the employee paid
into the fund or not, and whether the benefit was based on years of
service or not-do not provide the basis for a distinction. In either case,
the right (the contingent contract right) given is in return for work
during the community and would be the product of effort during the
community and thus community property. In any event, the case is
important in continuing the ongoing trend to apply the real subrogation
analysis to these types of payments."
54. 577 So. 2d 184 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1991).
55. Id. at 186.
56. 529 So. 2d 59 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1988).
57. 532 So. 2d 503 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1988) (criticized in K. Spaht & L. Hargrave,
supra note 5, at 3).
58. The lower court judge had also pointed out in Arnaud that when the husband
reaches 65, the former wife will be entitled to a portion of his benefit at that time, 577
So. 2d at 186.
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E. Interspousal Contracts-Form-Bank Account Transmutations
The fourth circuit court of appeal in Graffeo v. Graffeoll went
beyond existing law in finding an informal transmutation of a savings
and loan account from separate to community. The husband had simply
instructed the institution to change the name of the account from "Paul
Graffeo or Deborah Graffeo" to "Paul Graffeo or Gail Graffeo," thus
substituting the name of his new wife for that of his daughter.
Donations between spouses have long been allowed, but the tradi-
tional form requirement of an authentic act to donate incorporeal rights
has tended to limit informal transfers of funds on deposit in bank
accounts.
Since 1982, donations of negotiable instruments have been subject
to the rules of the commercial code; endorsement or delivery of the
instrument is adequate to transfer ownership without other formalities.
Some certificates of deposit are negotiable instruments, but the typical
bank savings or checking account is not.
Louisiana Civil Code article 2343.1, adopted in 1981, supplies a
special rule for converting a separate asset into a community one. It
preserves the authentic act requirement of such transfers by donation;
however, any written instrument suffices for a spouse to transform a
separate asset into a community asset in an onerous transaction. The
article provides:
The transfer by a spouse to the other spouse of a thing
forming part of his separate property, with the stipulation that
it shall be part of the community, transforms the thing into
community property. As to both movables and immovables, a
transfer by onerous title must be made in writing and a transfer
by gratuitous title must be made by authentic act.
Also relevant to onerous transmutations is the power of the spouses,
since the 1980 revision, to contract with each other.60 Under those general
rules, onerous oral contracts would be permitted to the same extent that
such contracts are valid between non-married persons."
In Graffeo, the savings and loan account was listed in the husband's
name "or" that of his daughter although he was the sole owner of the
funds. In May 1983, less than a month after his fifth marriage, he
59. 576 So. 2d 596 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1991).
60. Comment, Interspousal Contracts, 42 La. L. Rev. 727 (1982).
61. It may be arguable that Article 2343.1, being the more recent and more specific
article, requires a writing for an onerous transaction that is a transmutation of separate
to community. Absent that addition, there would be no such requirement for transfers
of movables. It would seem to make little sense to require a writing to transform the
asset to a community one, but allow transfer from the separate estate of one spouse to
the separate estate of the other without the need of any writing.
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arranged for removal of the daughter's name so that it was in his name
"or" that of his wife. The marriage didn't work out; in October of
the same year he removed the money from the account and transferred
it to a certificate of deposit issued in his name alone. The petition for
separation was filed in March of 1984.
If the May events were intended as a donation of 1/2 the account
to the new wife as a separate asset, it was not a valid donation for
lack of the authentic form required under Louisiana Civil Code article
1536. If the intent was to transform the account into a community asset
by donation under Article 2343.1, it also required authentic form. If it
was to engage in an onerous transaction that stipulated the account
would be community, Article 2343.1 required a writing. If the intent
was to engage in an onerous transaction transferring a 1/2 interest in
the account of the separate estate of the wife, it was not covered by
these articles and presumably could proceed as a valid oral contract.
Several questions would then arise: 1) whether there was an intent
to transfer; 2) if so, was it gratuitous or onerous; 3) was the intent to
make the asset community or to give her 1/2 as separate property; and
4) depending on the answers to these questions, were the form require-
ments met?
The court of appeal affirmed the lower court ruling that the account
was a community asset. It apparently found intent to transfer an interest
in the property to the new wife and that the transfer was not gratuitous.
The court stated the record "supports a finding that the transfer was
by onerous donation."6 In support of that conclusion the court stated
that the new wife testified "that Paul Graffeo placed her name on the
account after she gave up her full time job at Mr. Graffeo's request
and moved out of her house.''63 The husband and his daughter had
testified that the change of names was "only to provide for her needs
in the event that Mr. Graffeo should become incapacitated. '"6
If the court was using the phrase "onerous donation" precisely,
that is, one "which is burdened with charges imposed on the donee,"'
then that was only the beginning of the inquiry. Under Louisiana Civil
Code article 1524, one must value the thing involved and the charges.
Article 1526 is more exact; the rules peculiar to donations do not apply
to onerous donations "except when the value of the object given exceeds
by one-half that of the charges or of the services." At the least, the
court should have determined these values before concluding that the
formalities required of donations were not needed.
62. 576 So. 2d at 597.
63. Id. at 597.
64. Id. at 598.
65. La. Civ. Code art. 1523.
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The court did not discuss whether the intent was to make the asset
community or to give the wife 1/2 as separate property. Nonetheless,
it must have assumed the former since it upheld a determination that
the property was community.
The court of appeal also supported its result by giving deference to
the fact-finding by the trial court (commissioner and reviewing judge)
to support the conclusions that there was an intent to transfer. The
case may thus become a maverick one based on its unique facts. To
seriously hold as a legal or logical proposition that a transaction is
onerous when a prospective bride gives up a job and moves in with a
husband would make almost every transfer of an engagement ring an
onerous transfer.
In any event, the court seemed to assume that Article 2343.1 was
the governing article and that an intent to transform the account into
a community asset was present. Although the court did not go into
detail about the mechanics of the name change on the account, it
concluded that "the substitution of Ms. Graffeo's name on the account
constitutes sufficient writing and sufficient indication of intent to transfer
the account into the community."" Presumably Mr. Graffeo must at
some point have completed a form or signed a document indicating the
names he desired to have in the account's title. That would be a writing.
However, Article 2343.1 requires more than a writing. It states that "a
transfer by onerous title must be made in writing." Also, the text refers
to a transfer "with the stipulation that it shall be part of the com-
munity." This language would seem to require some type of written
statement of the transferor's intent to transfer, and a "stipulation"
seems more than a casual account name change.
The underlying policy of the writing requirement is to avoid having
to have recourse to swearing matches, as here, to establish the intent
of the parties. Here, the writing-a change of name on the account-
was certainly an equivocal act. It could have represented an intent not
to give ownership at all, but a matter of convenience, as was the case
when the daughter's name was on the account. It could have represented
an intent to donate to her separate estate. It could have represented an
intent to donate by way of converting the account into community
property. It could have represented an intent to transfer 1/2 ownership
to her separate estate by an onerous transaction. Or it could have
represented an intent to transform the asset into community property
as part of an onerous transaction. All it was, however, was an instruction
to the savings and loan association about how to list an account, along'
with a signature card. Any intent to transfer had to be inferred from
the conduct of changing the account names. And, of course, the tra-
66. Graffeo v. Graffeo, 576 So. 2d 596, 598 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1991).
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ditional Louisiana law is that title to such rights is not dispositive of
ownership. Also, "if there is any doubt, transfers of this kind should
be interpreted as onerous donations since this seems the better way to
grant protection to the interests of the parties involved. ' 7
Another policy behind the form requirements is that of impressing
on the party the gravity and seriousness of certain transactions. Parties
are thus protected from their whims and casual undertakings. This might
well have been a case where a person would have benefitted from such
a precautionary requirement.
In Graffeo, the fourth circuit was more liberal in finding such
binding transformations than the third circuit was in Succession of
Davis." In Davis, the husband planned to sell a separate tract of land
by a credit sale. The act of sale listed the husband and wife as sellers;
the promissory note given in exchange was made payable to the husband
and wife.
The court refused to apply Louisiana Civil Code article 2343.1
because "the record is devoid of any transfer of property between
decedent and appellant stipulating that the note should be part of the
community." The court also stated, "[tihe appearance of appellant's
name as a seller on the Act of Sale and as a payee on the promissory
note did not transform decedent's separate property into community
property." 69 The third circuit was unwilling to make the inferences of
intent to transfer that the fourth circuit panel was.70
The case also involved a donation to her or to the community by
authentic act. There was an authentic act here, the act listing the husband
and wife as sellers, and signed by both of them, transferring ownership
to the buyers. There was something of a form requirement met, for
although the act did not state the transfer, as it did not do so in
Graffeo, nonetheless it was an act before a notary and two witnesses.
In any event, here there is as much basis as in Graffeo to infer
intent to transfer an interest in the thing. There was more basis for
finding that the underlying policies were met: the cautionary function
of the notary and witness was served by the transfer, and the note was
67. S. Litvinoff, Obligations § 103, at 180-81, in 6 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise
(1969) (emphasis in original).
68. 496 So. 2d 549 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1986).
69. Id. at 553.
70. Davis is consistent with Judge Miller's opinion in Succession of Broussard, 306
So. 2d 399 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975), the celebrated case in which the wife's earnings
from her beauty shop were classified as community even though they had been deposited
in a bank account listed in her name alone. She had argued that her husband intended
to donate those earnings to her. He had since died, and the court stated, "A litigant's
testimony in her own favor to establish a large claim against a succession is received with
great caution. It is, in itself, of the weakest character, and, unless strongly corroborated,
cannot serve as a basis for judgment." Id. at 403.
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part of that transfer. In terms of basic policies, there seems to be more
basis to find an intent to share with the other spouse than in Graffeo.
Obviously, both these cases involved having to superimpose complex
legal conclusions over thin and equivocal factual situations. In both
cases, it seems that the parties probably never clearly thought out the
implications of their acts, as is often the case in such matters. Flowing
in the courts' opinions are basic policies about how much and how
easily spouses should be able to be sharing with each other and the
extent to which courts should be protecting spouses against their possible
poor judgment in making informal transfers. The third circuit seems
more inclined to protect the spouses against their unwise acts that, in
Davis, would harm the interests of the children of a prior marriage.
The fourth circuit seems more inclined to protect the interests of the
spouse, albeit a very short term one.
